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NYKBocker
Posts: 38411 Alba Posts: 474 Joined: 1/14/2003 Member: #377 USA |
6/13/2011 12:22 PM
K22 wrote: Is this the photoshopped version of the NBA Big Head commericals? |
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NYKBocker
Posts: 38411 Alba Posts: 474 Joined: 1/14/2003 Member: #377 USA |
6/13/2011 12:25 PM
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martin
Posts: 76215 Alba Posts: 108 Joined: 7/24/2001 Member: #2 USA |
6/13/2011 4:29 PM
Decent article.
Final thoughts Mavs’ title, LeBron’s collapse
Some scattered thoughts on the Finals that didn’t quite make it into any of my posts since last night’s game … • The ultimate tribute to the Mavs is that they won the clinching game when three big things that had gone right for them all series long finally went wrong: Dirk Nowitzki struggled from the floor, the Heat finally got to line a ton and Tyson Chandler found himself in serious foul trouble without Brendan Haywood available as a backup. (Side note: The faster pace of Game 6 inflated Miami’s free-throw total a bit, but Dallas finally won the free-throw battle as handily as it so often did against other teams.) That Dallas survived those things speaks to its depth, creativity and plain old luck. Ian Mahinmi hit two crazy jumpers, the Heat missed too many foul shots and the refs did not blow the whistle on one or two 50/50 calls that could have gotten Nowitzki in foul trouble. Whatever luck the Mavs got, they deserved, because they did just about every fundamental thing they needed to do to win this series. They limited their turnovers, avoided fouling too much (a skill the Mavs displayed all season) and shot three-pointers well. • The praise for Dallas coach Rick Carlisle and his staff is overflowing, and it is richly deserved. The Mavs’ coaches and players made all the right adjustments, especially on the offensive end, where they gradually learned how to score against Miami’s ultra-aggressive defense. The decision to start J.J. Barea is the obvious one and will get a lot of attention, but the little adjustments added up to more. Nowitzki, as he always does, learned how to mix up the way he set screens (especially for Barea), slip into open space when his man trapped the ball-handler and shoot or drive quickly, while Miami’s defense was in mid-rotation. Dallas realized Miami had no consistent answer for all the funky ways the Mavs ran that staggered screen play for Jason Terry. They found that using Nowitzki as a decoy could net them some good looks on Chandler pick-and-rolls. They consistently made the right pass around the perimeter, whether the target was the obvious open man or the shooter just about to come open as Miami’s defense began its next rotation. (Kidd is especially good at finding that player. Reading defenses on the fly is part of his genius.) The Dallas defense played well almost from start to finish, with few major changes along the way. The Mavs won this series by solving Miami’s defense. • Terry was tremendous in the last two games of this series, and as we neared the end of Game 6, there was a small groundswell of support for him as something of a Finals MVP candidate. I like the sentiment, but perhaps folks should look elsewhere for the Maverick who most deserves a tiny slice of that MVP trophy. Chandler was the second-best Maverick overall. He was the foundation of a defensive strategy built on his ability to leave Chris Bosh on pick-and-rolls, temporarily cover LeBron James and Dwyane Wade, keep those guys out of the paint and then rotate back to find a big man to guard. And he was fantastic at it. It is no coincidence that LeBron’s most aggressive drives, to the degree they existed at all, came on pick-and-rolls that involved Nowitzki as the primary defender instead of Chandler. James and Wade just couldn’t figure Chandler out. Chandler didn’t score all that much — he averaged almost exactly 10 points a game — but the offensive rebounds he collected in the early and middle stages of the series gave Dallas the second chances it needed before the offense cracked Miami’s code. Terry was wonderful, but he was inconsistent, especially in the fourth quarter, until the latter stages of Game 4. Chandler was there from the start, on both ends. • All this said, I hope it’s obvious Nowitzki is the MVP. He is at the center of everything in Dallas’ offense; even the plays on which he acts as a decoy are in the playbook only because he is such a threatening decoy. He was neutral on defense, and that was a win for Dallas. He struggled to contain ball-handlers when Miami attacked him in the pick-and-roll, and his defensive rebounding was inconsistent. But he was really good at positioning himself down low on the pick-and-rolls where Chandler helped up top — plays in which Nowitzki briefly had to guard both his man and the big guy rolling the hoop. • In a must-read post at ESPN.com, David Thorpe praises Erik Spoelstra and at the same time wonders if the Heat will fire him out of impatience or worry that he might not be the right guy to make all of this work. It’s an interesting thought, even as Michael Wallace of ESPN’s Heat Index reports that Miami’s owner, Micky Arison, has indicated Spoelstra is safe. There is no question the Finals were a step back for Miami’s offense. It’s hard to tell how much of that is on Spoelstra, especially given LeBron’s listless play. Miami’s commitment to its best offensive sets waxed and waned, especially in crunch-time, when the Heat too often fell into hero ball or simple pick-and-roll sets that did not seem to include a Plan B. They did not call as many of their favored corner plays, in which James or Wade darts off an off-ball screen in the corner, but Dallas deserves credit for scouting that stuff well. Still: In Game 6, the Heat looked like a well-prepared team that understood how it functioned best offensively. They called creative post-up sets for James, attacked in delayed transition and used LeBron as a screener a few times. They had the right idea against the zone, save for a few possessions on which Wade or James chucked a long jumper. The Heat’s coaching staff spent an entire season gradually molding an offense out of several brand new pieces. It didn’t always work, and parsing out blame for that is tough. But the progress was undeniable, and it flowed from a a coaching staff willing to tweak and prod until they got things right. That’s the kind of coaching staff I’d want on my team. POSNANSKI: When Miami needed a hero the most, LeBron wanted the ball the least • The Heat’s offense was good enough in the first half of Game 6 to force Dallas into more zone than the Mavs played in any prior game. This was not a case of Dallas coming out of a timeout and springing a zone on Miami as an opportunistic tactic. The zone in Game 6 came from a position of weakness, but the zone itself was not weak, since Dallas committed to using it as something more than a gimmick from the first game of the season. • The personnel limits Miami faced beyond the big three were the bigger story, and as Thorpe points out, Pat Riley has to take a bit of hit for inking creaky old guys instead of springy young guys for the supporting roles. Bad luck with health hurt, too. Udonis Haslem and Mike Miller were supposed to be the ideal supporting pieces, but they struggled with injuries all season and weren’t quite ready for the biggest stage. The Heat’s dream lineup, featuring all five of these guys, logged just about 13:45 in the Finals — a shade over two measly minutes per game. • The Heat need more long-range shooting, something Miller couldn’t really provide this season. As good as James and Wade can be — and LeBron improved his mid-range shot this season before imploding after Game 1 — teams are always going to pack the paint and concede long jumpers. Neither is an above-average three-point shooter, and the Heat’s only consistent long-range shooting came from limited spot-up guys who caught drive-and-kick passes from the stars. The single best thing that could happen for Miami would be for James or Wade to develop into an elite three-point shooter. That is unlikely to happen, at least in the short term. If it doesn’t, Miami could really use a guy who can space the floor and catch-and-shoot on the move. • Shawn Marion’s 15 points per game in the Finals was a colossal thing. Just huge. The Dallas offense functioned best all season with Marion sitting, and his lack of range made him the guy every team helped off. Opponents couldn’t do that when Peja Stojakovic played in Marion’s place, but the Mavs could not play Stojakovic in the Finals. And so Marion had to play more, and that would have been something of a net loss for Dallas had he not been able to exploit the holes Miami gave him. The Heat left him open on purpose, as part of their defensive scheme, and Marion made them pay by moving into open space, hitting floaters and posting up when he had an advantage. His ability to score on Miller in the post was a one of those key little things that can swing a series, since it neutralized Miami’s dream lineup. • The Barea move, by the way, was smart realization on Carlisle’s part that any minutes Mike Bibby played represented a precious chance to put one of Dallas’ so-so little guy defenders on the floor without consequences. It was something Carlisle really started to do in Game 1, when he pulled DeShawn Stevenson for Barea with about 9:30 left in the third quarter. • Chris Bosh said after Game 6 that he did not get as many touches as he’d have liked. And yet I couldn’t help but watch that game and feel the one thing Miami has absolutely gotten right this season is the way it uses Bosh on offense. He is the third wheel, destined for life as a release valve on pick-and-pop plays and sets in which he mans the weak side, ready to rain open jumpers if the defense overloads on the ball. His isolation attacks in the last two rounds were mostly limited to moments when he found himself matched up against an opponent’s weaker big man defender — Carlos Boozer or Nowitzki. And that, really, is at it should be for Miami. That was the vision of signing Bosh as the third guy. Sure, it might have been useful to give him an extra two or three attempts, but that is picking at the fringes. He was brought in to be the best third option in the league, and he played that role well for most of the playoffs — and most of the Finals. • That said, he just could not contain Chandler on the glass. Chandler was able to shove Bosh under the hoop and take him out of ideal rebounding position. I’m not sure Bosh could have done much more, even if it appeared Chandler outworked him a bit; Chandler is just bigger and stronger. • The series obviously turned with the Dallas Game 2 comeback, and while the defining “turning point “image of the series will always be Wade’s reaction to the three he hit near the Mavs bench go put Miami up 88-73, I’ll also remember what came on Miami’s next possession. After a Dallas timeout and a Chandler miss, the Heat surprised the Mavs with a LeBron/Wade pick-and-roll on which both Dallas defenders (Kidd and Marion) followed LeBron after the pick. Wade was open, in position for the kill. But instead of driving, he pulled up for the glamour shot — the three off the dribble — and missed. It was the start of Miami’s collapse, and a moment that called for a better decision. • LeBron James had trouble against Chicago and Dallas following guys around screens off the ball. We saw him take weird, often too-wide routes while chasing Luol Deng, Terry and Stojakovic. This is something to watch going forward. • There was a play late in the first quarter of Game 3, when LeBron posted up Marion, caught the ball on the left wing, faced up and saw Nowitzki coming over to help. LeBron surveyed the scene, and at the exact moment Nowitzki retreated back to where he came from, LeBron put the ball on the floor and drove all the way to the hoop for a dunk. That happened. That guy vanished sometime in Game 4. Official sponsor of the PURE KNICKS LOVE Program
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martin
Posts: 76215 Alba Posts: 108 Joined: 7/24/2001 Member: #2 USA |
6/15/2011 10:03 AM
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